Hostelworld is the number destination for hostel accommodation. Hostelworld serves 7 million travellers annually, with more than 120 million combined visitors across its website and mobile apps. 

However, the travel product had become commoditized. In many cases, the same room was available on Booking.com, another OTA, or the hostel’s own site.

That changes the economics fast. If the product looks the same everywhere, you end up buying demand. And if you rely on paid marketing, larger platforms usually win.

At the time, Hostelworld was spending about 60 to 65 percent of revenue on marketing. That number made the problem obvious.

Then COVID hit.

Revenue fell almost immediately after I joined. First, we had to survive. But the bigger question was what Hostelworld should be when travel came back.

Not a smaller Booking.com.

A social travel platform for hostel travelers.

The problem

Hostelworld did not have a basic demand problem.

People still wanted to travel. Young travelers still wanted hostels. The brand still meant something.

The problem was that booking alone was no longer enough.

If Hostelworld competed only as a marketplace, it would be fighting Booking.com on Booking.com’s terms: more inventory, more data, more budget, and better paid acquisition economics.

So the question became simple:

Why book on Hostelworld if the same bed is somewhere else?

The answer was not price. It was the reason people choose hostels in the first place.

They want to meet people. They want the energy, the randomness, the sense that something is already happening when they arrive.

Most travel platforms treat accommodation as a transaction. Hostelworld had permission to build around the social side of travel.

The strategy

We moved Hostelworld from hostel booking toward social travel.

The Product Was: Search > Compare > Book.

The Product Now is: Discover > Connect > Arrive with plans.

The point was to help travelers understand not only where they were staying, but who else would be there.

That gave Hostelworld a reason to exist that larger OTAs were unlikely to copy with much conviction. Booking.com is built for transaction scale. Hostelworld could be built around social intent.

This was not a brand campaign. It was a business decision.

If social features could improve conversion, repeat use, direct traffic, and brand preference, Hostelworld could reduce its dependence on paid marketing over time.

The hard part

The strategy was clear. The hard part was focus.

In a crisis, every option sounds reasonable. Every acquisition idea, product extension, and side project has someone defending it.

But Hostelworld did not need more options. It needed a sharper center.

So we used one filter:

Does this help Hostelworld become the best platform for social hostel travel?

If not, we challenged it.

That meant stopping some work that was interesting but off-strategy. It meant saying no to distractions. Product, marketing, brand, and leadership had to point at the same idea.

A smaller roadmap made the company stronger.

The operating model

The strategy changed how the company worked.

Product could not just ship features. It had to create a reason to choose Hostelworld. Marketing could not just buy users. It had to build demand around that reason. Brand could not just talk about travel. It had to own the emotional reason people choose hostels. Data could not just report bookings. It had to show whether the social layer changed behavior.

Bookings, revenue, CAC, and conversion still mattered. But we also needed to know whether travelers were creating profiles, joining communities, engaging before arrival, and using the product to find people.

The point was not to bolt social features onto a booking app. The point was to change why customers came to Hostelworld.

Reducing marketing dependency

One clear result was lower marketing intensity.

When I joined, marketing spend was about 60 to 65 percent of revenue. By the time I left, it was below 49 percent.

That mattered. It showed the business was not just recovering. The revenue was getting healthier. Hostelworld was becoming less dependent on buying demand and more focused on giving customers a reason to come directly.

What changed

Before, Hostelworld was a strong brand in a commoditized booking market, with heavy reliance on paid acquisition.

After, it had a clearer position: own the social experience of hostel travel.

That changed the product vision, the marketing model, the investor story, and how the company made decisions.

Hostelworld stopped trying to win as a smaller OTA. It started building around what hostel travelers actually cared about.

The lesson

Many internet businesses do not need more growth. They need a better reason to exist. If the product is commoditized, marketing hides the problem for a while.

If the strategy is unclear, more features create noise.

If the company is competing on terms that favor larger players, spending harder is not the answer. Changing the basis of competition is.

For Hostelworld, that meant moving away from generic accommodation booking and toward social travel.

The company already had the brand, the audience, and a category with a real emotional need. The work was to focus the business around that need and turn it into a more defensible model.

Taking a company with real assets but a weakening position, finding the sharper wedge, and rebuilding the business around it creates durability.

Impact Breakdown over 3 years 3 months

KPIBeforeAfter
Revenue 40m100m
Marketing as a % of revenue65%48%
Mobile app traffic contribution20%90%
EBITA 15%20%